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Research Article                         
Abstract 
Purpose: The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between corporate governance (CG) 
elements, namely board characteristics (board size, independence, expertise) and audit committee 
characteristics (audit committee size, independence, and expertise) with profitability, measured in terms 
of return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE).  
Method: This study includes data of all listed firms of the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) in Bangladesh 
under the category of pharmaceutical and chemical industry (total 31 firms) for 3 years from 2015/16 to 
2017/18. The theoretical foundation of the study is based on agency theory. It applied panel data set in the 
regression model Using Fixed-Effects with Driscoll and Kraay’s Standard Errors to test the hypothesis. 
The study model also considers two control variables, viz. firm size and leverage.  
Results: Empirical results of the study presents that board size, board expertise, and audit committee size 
have a significant positive relationship with both the measure of profitability i.e. return on assets (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE). Moreover, audit committee expertise has a significant negative relationship 
with ROA but an insignificant relationship with ROE. However, the other variables do not have a 
significant influence on profitability.    
Implications: This study will extend the literature of CG and profitability in an emerging economy like 
Bangladesh. The agency problem can be solved with the more vigilant practice of CG. This study could be 
extended further by considering all listed firms of DSE which may provide us more insight into CG 
practice in Bangladesh. 
 
Keywords: Board characteristics, Audit committee characteristics, Profitability, Pharmaceutical, 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate governance and its impact on the company's profitability are the most discussed 
topics in the current literature. Corporate governance can be defined as a mechanism to control 
the activities of the company which will offer better transparency and accountability (Aggarwal, 
2013; Cadbury, 1992). The three key elements of corporate governance are - Shareholders, Board 
of Directors and Management. The discussion focused on the structure of the board of directors, 
which is actually the main governance mechanism of the internal control system for any 
company or organization. Researchers studying corporate governance have used various 
theoretical concepts to understand the characteristics, effects, and roles of these boards. The 
theoretical argument of the agency is an explanation of the relationship between the 
shareholder and the board of directors (Aggarwal, 2013). The Board of Directors is responsible 
for due accountability, transparency, and diligence to manage corporate affairs and maximize 
shareholder wealth. It is generally believed that there is a direct and clear link between the 
behavior of the board and the success of the organization, measured by factors such as 
profitability, stock price, and reputation.  
Corporate governance affects profitability and the sustainability of the organization which 
becomes a critical problem after the collapse of large companies in the Europe and United States 
(Aggarwal, 2013). In Bangladesh, it is a fact that highly respected companies fail due to bad 
corporate governance. Previous studies mainly focus on the issue of corporate governance 
practice and its effects in the context of the developed economy (Pervin & Rashid, 2019). 
However, from the developing country perspective, including Bangladesh still, there is a dearth 
of knowledge (Hasan & Rahman, 2017; Rashid, 2009). Moreover, Bangladesh Securities and 
Exchange Commission (BSEC) has revised corporate governance guidelines in 2012 and 
updated in recent times which is expected to enhance corporate governance practices within the 
organization (BSEC, 2012; Pervin & Rashid, 2019). Against this backdrop, the present study sets 
out its objective to analyze the impacts of corporate governance on the profitability of the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries. This study is expected to contribute to the literature in 
different ways: First, the study focuses on pharmaceutical and chemical industries in 
Bangladesh which have the second-highest contribution in GDP (Alam, 2019). Second, the study 
considers the two most important elements of corporate governance i.e. Board characteristics 
and Audit committee characteristics, that will provide additional insights regarding CG. Third, 
the context of the study is Bangladesh, which is regarded as an emerging economy, moving to 
middle-income countries from the list of LDC's ("World Bank Press Release," July 01, 2015). The 
findings of the study may be a yardstick for the rest of the developing countries. Finally, this 
study may help the regulator to improve the corporate governance code and, more importantly, 
it may serve as a reference for the shareholders of organizations to designate people for the key 
positions of the management. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Corporate governance is a system of management and regulation of a firm. Here, the board of 
directors is responsible for the management of the company. The role of shareholders is to 
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appoint directors and auditors, so as to endure an adequate and satisfactory governance 
structure. In addition, corporate governance aims to support entrepreneurial, effective, and 
prudent management that can guarantee the long-term success of the company. Agency theory 
suggests that management behavior is opportunistic, that means they act for their own interest 
rather than principal interest, which can be restrained by offering better corporate governance 
practices otherwise it could be detrimental to the economic welfare of the principals (Deegan, 
2014; Hasan & Rahman, 2019; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Literature suggests that Board 
composition and audit committee characteristics are the main two components of corporate 
governance (Brown & Caylor, 2004). Board composition refers to the size of the board, the 
expertise of the board members, board independence or CEO duality (Aggarwal, 2013) and the 
audit committee characteristics comprise committee size, independence and/or expertise. 
Previous studies, investigate the relationship between board characteristics and profitability as 
well as audit committee characteristics and profitability (Alshetwi, 2017; Chemweno, 2016; Johl, 
Kaur, & Cooper, 2015; Oroud, 2019). However, the outcomes of those studies are not conclusive.   
2.1 Board Size and Profitability 
It is argued in literature that the size of board has influence on the firm's performance, i.e. the 
larger board of directors, the more experienced and knowledgeable people will be available 
which will lead to more careful learning, decision-making process and ultimately better firm 
performance (Alabdullah, Yahya, Nor, & Majeed, 2016; Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2004). Earlier 
literature documented that the large board in good for better management and positively 
associated with profitability (Alabdullah et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2004; Arora, 2012; Johl et 
al., 2015). However, few studies suggest that the smaller size of the board is good for 
management and able to increase the profitability of the firm, i.e. firm size has an inverse 
relationship with profitability (Chatterjee, 2011; Switzer & Tang, 2009; Yermack, 1996). Based on 
the above discussion, this study hypothesizes that,  
H1: Board size has a significant positive association with the profitability of the firm.    
2.2 Board Independence and Profitability 
Board comprises both affiliate and non-affiliated members of the company, who are responsible 
for the policy of the firm and supervise the activities of top management. It is preferable for 
investors to have a higher number of non-affiliated members on the board (Muniandy & Hillier, 
2015). Investors believe that it will help to curtail the undue influence of the affiliated board 
members, which may minimize the agency cost and ensure better financial performance of the 
firm (Muniandy & Hillier, 2015). Literature suggests that board independence has a positive 
relationship with profitability, i.e. the higher number of independent members in the board will 
increase the profitability of the firm (Jackling & Johl, 2009; Switzer & Tang, 2009). However, few 
studies documented negative or no relationship between board independence and profitability 
(Alabdullah et al., 2016; Chatterjee, 2011; Johl et al., 2015). Accordingly, this study assumes that,  
H2: Board independence has a significant positive relationship with profitability.  
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2.3 Board Expertise and Profitability 
Board expertise refers to the presence of financial or accounting experts in the board. It is 
argued that the presence of experts in the board reduces the likelihood of a wrong decision or 
increases the possibility of taking prudent decisions. The appropriate mix of the board member 
in terms of expertise and knowledge is required to cope up with a complex business 
environment (Johl et al., 2015). Earlier studies described that there is a positive relationship 
between board expertise and profitability (Johl et al., 2015; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Wan 
Yusoff & Armstrong, 2012). However, a few studies also documented a negative relationship 
between board expertise and profitability (Van Ness, Miesing, & Kang, 2010). Based on the 
inconclusive findings in the literature on accounting/financial expertise of board members, this 
study intends to further address this issue in the context of Bangladesh, with the following 
hypothesis:  
H3: There is a significant positive relationship between board expertise and profitability.  
2.4 Audit Committee Size and Profitability  
The audit committee is an important element of the internal corporate governance mechanism, 
which ensures transparency and accountability within the organization. It is argued that the 
agency problem can be reduced by the effective role of the audit committee (Detthamrong, 
Chancharat, & Vithessonthi, 2017; Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Kipkoech & Rono, 
2016). Earlier studies documented that the size of the audit committee has a significant impact 
on firms' performance in terms of profitability (Aldamen, Duncan, Kelly, McNamara, & Nagel, 
2012; Detthamrong et al., 2017). It is perceived that the audit committee size has a positive 
relationship with firm performance (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2007). Accordingly, the 
study hypothesizes that,  
H4: There is a significant positive relationship between audit committee size and profitability 
2.5 Audit Committee Independence and Profitability 
The audit committee comprises both independent and non-independent members, which 
ensures better management through transparency and accountability in the operation. 
Literature suggests that the presence of outside directors in the audit committee may reduce the 
opportunistic behavior of the manager and reduce the agency cost (Bouaine & Hrichi, 2019; De 
Vlaminck & Sarens, 2015; Sultana, Singh, & Van der Zahn, 2015). It means the independence of 
the audit committee has a positive association with profitability (Dinu & Nedelcu, 2015; 
Kallamu & Saat, 2015). However, a few studies also documented no relationship between audit 
committee independence and profitability (Oroud, 2019). Based on the above discussion, the 
study hypothesizes that,  
H5: There is a significant positive relationship between audit committee independence and 
profitability. 
2.6 Audit Committee Expertise and Profitability 
The primary role of the audit committee requires the skilled capability of its members for 
effective monitoring which leads to better management and transparency in financial reporting. 
As it requires the members to have financial or accounting expertise, previous literature 
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suggests that the presence of an expert member in the audit committee offers better 
management and financial reporting quality (Glover-Akpey & Azembila, 2016; Oroud, 2019). 
Thus, an audit committee with at least one member with expertise in finance and accounting is 
likely to increase the relevance of earnings (Qin, 2007). It is also being observed that audit 
committee expertise has a positive association with firm performance (Amer, Ragab, & Shehata, 
2014; DeZoort, 1998; Saseela & Thirunavukkarasu, 2018). However, few studies documented an 
inverse relationship or an insignificant relationship between audit committee expertise and 
profitability (Amer et al., 2014; Glover-Akpey & Azembila, 2016). Accordingly, this study 
hypothesizes that,  
H6: There is a significant positive relationship between audit committee expertise and profitability 
3. Methodology and Definition of Variables 
3.1 Sample Selection 
This study is conducted on all 31 pharmaceutical and Chemical companies listed in the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange (DSE) under the category of pharmaceutical and chemical sector, which 
comprises 15.4% share of the market capitalization of DSE (Alam, 2019). This study covers 3 
years of data from 2015/16 to 2017/18 as all companies have to set their accounting year from 
July-June, by 2015/16 as per the directive of Bangladesh Securities Exchange Commission 
(BSEC, 2016). Accordingly, 31*3=93 firm years observations are considered for the study. All of 
the relevant information and data are collected from published annual reports of the companies.  
3.2 Research Model and Variable definition 
To investigate the impact of board characteristics and audit committee characteristics on firm's 
profitability, this study like previous studies, applied ROA and ROE as the proxies of financial 
performance (Amer et al., 2014; Ghalib, 2018; Iqbal & Kakakhel, 2016; Oroud, 2019), which are 
tested against corporate governance elements. The theoretical framework of the study is given 
below:  
 
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Study Framework 
 
There is a total of six independent variables that are applied in the research model, namely 
board size (BSZ), board independence (BIN), board expertise (BEX), audit committee size 
(ACSZ), audit committee independence (ACID) and audit committee expertise (ACEX). Besides, 
Board Characteristics: 
Board Size 
Board Independence 
Board Expertise  
Audit Committee Characteristics: 
Board Size 
Board Independence 
Board Expertise  
Profitability:  
ROA (Return on Assets) 
ROE (Return on Equity) 
©Hasan, Molla & Khan 
69 Published by Research & Innovation Initiative, 3112 Jarvis Ave, Warren, MI 48091, USA 
 
this study applies two control variables in line with the previous literature, viz. firm size (FSZ) 
and Leverage (LVG) (Bronson, Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Neal, 2009; Klein, 2002; Sharma, 
Naiker, & Lee, 2009). This study applied panel data set in the regression model Using Fixed-
Effects with Driscoll and Kraay’s Standard Errors to test the hypotheses and the relationship 
between the dependent and explanatory variables. Statistical analysis is conducted by using 
STATA 13 software, which is widely used for panel data analysis. The specification of the 
research model is given below:  
ROAit = β0 + β1BDSZit + β2BDINDit + β3BDEXit + β4ACSZit + β5ACEXit + β6ACINDit + β7FSZit 
+ β8LEVit + εit            (1) 
ROEit = β0 + β1BDSZit + β2BDINDit + β3BDEXit + β4ACSZit + β5ACEXit + β6ACINDit + β7FSZit 
+ β8LEVit + εit            (2) 
Table 1: Variable definition and measurement 
Name of Variable Symbol Explanation 
Return on Assets ROA Operating income divided by Total Assets 
Return on Equity ROE Net income divided by shareholders' 
equity 
Size of the board BDSZ Number of directors present in the board 
Independence of the board BDIND The proportion of independent directors 
who are members of the board 
Competence of the board BDEX The proportion of finance/accounting 
experts who are members of the board 
Size of the audit committee ACSZ Number of members in audit committee 
Competence of the audit 
committee 
ACEX The proportion of finance/accounting 
experts who are members of the audit 
committee 
Independence of the audit 
committee 
ACIND The proportion of independent directors 
who are members of the audit committee 
Firm Size FSZ Logarithm of total assets 
Leverage LEV Firm leverage for firm i at time t 
4. Findings and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
All data of the study are taken from the annual report of the company from 2015/16 to 2017/18. 
This study considers two proxy of profitability namely ROA and ROE along with six corporate 
governance elements in two categories and two control variables. Table 2 represents the 
descriptive results of the study variables. Study shows that the mean value of ROA in the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries of Bangladesh is 0.08 with standard deviation 0.097 
where the minimum value is 0.001 and the maximum value is 0.403, which is similar to the 
findings of Pervin and Rashid (2019) in Bangladesh and Johl et al. (2015) in Malaysia. In the case 
of ROE mean value is 0.178, range from 0.002 to 1.101 with a standard deviation of 0.229. It 
shows that the standard deviation is high in the case of ROE compare to ROA, which means 
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that few firms are highly debt-financed compared to others. Board characteristics is presented 
by board size which mean value is 7.075 range from 5 to 11 members, board independence with 
mean value of 0.268 range from 0.167 to 0.60 and board expertise with mean value of 0.071 
range from 0 to 0.333 which are similar to the study of Pervin and Rashid (2019) in Bangladesh, 
Alshetwi (2017) in Saudi Arabia.   
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ROA 0.080 0.097 0.001 0.403 
ROE 0.178 0.229 0.002 1.101 
BDSZ 7.075 1.895 5 11 
BDIND 0.268 0.105 0.167 0.600 
BDEX 0.071 0.068 0 0.333 
ACSZ 3.935 0.953 3 7 
ACIND 0.394 0.152 0.200 0.667 
ACEX 0.135 0.130 0 0.333 
FSZ 9.725 0.727 8.317 11.089 
LEV 0.133 0.091 0.001 0.354 
 
Moreover, audit committee characteristics is presented by audit committee size which mean 
value is 3.935 with maximum 7 and minimum 3 members, audit committee independence with 
mean value of 0.394 range from 0.20 to 0.667 and audit committee expertise with mean value of 
0.135 range from 0 to 0.333 which are similar to the study of Dinu and Nedelcu (2015) in 
Romania and Oroud (2019) in Jordan. Besides two control variables are the firm size with the 
mean value of 9.725 range from 8.317 to 11.089 and leverage with the mean value of 0.133 range 
from 0.001 to 0.354 as like previous studies (Amer et al., 2014; Pervin & Rashid, 2019). 
4.2 Correlation Matrix and VIF 
The correlation matrix shows the relationship between two variables, this relationship can be 
categorized into three parts which are low  (0.10-0.29),  medium  (0.30-0.49)  and high  (0.50-
0.99) correlation (Pallant, 2011). This study presents the correlation matrix in table 3 which 
represents the correlation between ROA and ROE with other study variables. From table 2, this 
study documented the highest correlation between ACEX and BDEX which is 60.01%, 
significant at 1% level. Where the lowest correlation exists between ACIND and ROA, i.e. 2.39% 
and insignificant. Most of the variables in this study have a medium level of correlation. It is 
mentioned that there is no correlation between variables which is higher than 90% as a sign of 
no multi-collinearity. In addition to the correlation matrix, this study also considers VIF and 
tolerance value to examine the issue of multicollinearity, present in table 4 (Hamilton, 2012).  
For both models, VIF values of all study variables are below 3 where tolerance value is more 
than 0.10. Literature suggests that VIF value below should be 10 and in correspondence to the 
VIF value, tolerance value should be 0.10 (Allison, 2012; Burns & Bush, 2005; Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). It means that there is no multicollinearity issue in the study model.  
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix  
Variables ROA ROE BDSZ BDIND BDEX ACSZ ACIND ACEX FSZ LEV 
ROA 1.000 -         
ROE - 1.000         
BDSZ 0.2129** 0.2124 1.000        
BDIND 0.1264 0.1843 -0.3066* 1.000       
BDEX 0.4343* 0.4215 0.3355* -0.1732*** 1.000      
ACSZ 0.5565* 0.5694 0.1411 0.2318** 0.3168* 1.000     
ACIND 0.0239 0.1006 0.0667 0.3765* 0.0367 -0.2593** 1.000    
ACEX 0.1092 0.1584 0.4442* -0.1846*** 0.6001* 0.1225 0.1180 1.000   
FSZ -0.1195 -0.1318 0.3183* -0.1826*** 0.0780 -0.0842 0.2114** 0.5079** 1.000  
LEV 0.2490** 0.2243 -0.4227* 0.2616** -0.2369** 0.2660* 0.1803*** -0.3678* -0.2579** 1.00 
Significant at *1%, **5%, ***10% level of significance 
ROA-Return on assets; BDSZ-Board size; BDIND-Board independence; BDEX-Board expertise; ACSZ-Audit committee 
size; ACIND-Audit committee independence; ACEX-Audit committee expertise; FSZ-Firm size in terms of total assets; 
LEV-Leverage refers to total debt/total assets.  
 
Table 4: VIF and Tolerance value 
Name of Variable 
Model 1 (ROA as DV) Model 1 (ROE as DV) 
VIF Tolerance value VIF Tolerance value 
BDSZ 2.08 0.481 1.91 0.522 
BDIND 2.47 0.404 2.18 0.459 
BDEX 2.73 0.365 2.26 0.443 
ACSZ 2.65 0.377 2.57 0.389 
ACIND 2.43 0.411 2.42 0.413 
ACEX 2.49 0.400 2.49 0.402 
FSZ 2.19 0.455 1.72 0.580 
LEV 2.13 0.469 2.13 0.469 
Mean VIF 2.33 - 2.21 - 
4.3 Test for autocorrelation and Heteroskedasticity 
This study also applied Wooldridge test and Breusch-Pagan test to clarify the issue of 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the data set. The result of both tests is presented in 
table 5, where the study documented that data used for the study has heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation issues, as both test results are significant at 1% level.  
 
Table: 5 Test of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in 
panel data 
Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
       F (1, 30) = 22.895 
      Prob > F = 0.0000 
H0: Constant variance  
Chi2 (1) = 25.20 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
Therefore,  this study corrected the three issues  by employing  Driscoll and  Kraay’s standard 
errors based on  Hoechle (2007)  which is robust  to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
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adjusted Driscoll and Kraay’s standard errors by  Hoechle (2007) is a  nonparametric covariance 
matrix  estimates the fixed-effect  model and valid for balanced and unbalanced panel data. 
4.4 Regression analysis 
Two elements of corporate governance, board characteristics (board size, independence, and 
expertise) and audit committee characteristics (audit committee size, independence, and 
expertise) have regressed against two proxy of profitability namely ROA and ROE by model 1 
and 2 respectively. Table 6 presents the adjusted R2 value for both models which are 0.483 and 
0.487 respectively, significant at 1% level. 
 
Table: 6: Result of regression model Using Fixed-Effects with Driscoll and Kraay’s 
Standard Errors 
ROAit = β0 + β1BDSZit + β2BDINDit + β3BDEXit + β4ACSZit + β5ACEXit + β6ACINDit + β7FSZit + β8LEVit 
+ εit                              (1) 
ROEit = β0 + β1BDSZit + β2BDINDit + β3BDEXit + β4ACSZit + β5ACEXit + β6ACINDit + β7FSZit + β8LEVit 
+ εit                                         (2) 
VARIABLES Expected Sign (Model 1_ROA as DV) (Model 2_ROE as DV) 
BDSZ + 0.0131*** 0.0226*** 
  (0.00350) (0.00779) 
BDIND + 0.0872 0.110 
  (0.0602) (0.130) 
BDEX + 0.620*** 0.978*** 
  (0.0236) (0.0372) 
ACSZ + 0.0310*** 0.104*** 
  (0.00367) (0.00880) 
ACIND + 0.00665 0.265 
  (0.0385) (0.191) 
ACEX + -0.122*** -0.0484 
  (0.0203) (0.107) 
FSZ  -0.00507 -0.0471** 
  (0.00544) (0.0201) 
LEV  0.300*** 0.410*** 
  (0.0723) (0.128) 
Constant  -0.179*** -0.184 
  (0.0567) (0.138) 
R-squared  0.483 0.487 
Observations  93 93 
No. of Company  31 31 
Prob > F  0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
ROA-Return on assets; ROE-Return on equity; BDSZ-Board size; BDIND-Board independence; 
BDEX-Board expertise; ACSZ-Audit committee size; ACIND-Audit committee independence; 
ACEX-Audit committee expertise; FSZ-Firm size in terms of total assets; LEV-Leverage refers to 
total debt/total assets. 
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The first model considering ROA as a dependent variable reveals that four out of six 
independent variables are significant at 1% level which are board size, board expertise, audit 
committee size, and audit committee expertise. However, audit committee expertise has a 
significant negative association with ROA at 1% level which is not supported by the hypothesis. 
A similar result is documented by Bouaine and Hrichi (2019), Cheah, Kuan, Chew, Low, and 
Poon (2016) and Glover-Akpey and Azembila (2016). Other three variables are supported by the 
hypothesis i.e. board size, board expertise and audit committee size (Amer et al., 2014; Iqbal & 
Kakakhel, 2016; Johl et al., 2015; Shukeri, Shin, & Shaari, 2012) have a significant positive 
relationship with ROA as like previous literature. However, board independence and audit 
committee independence do not have a significant relationship with ROA (Alshetwi, 2017). The 
Second model considering ROE as a dependent variable that documented that board size, board 
expertise and audit committee size (Oroud, 2019), all three have a significant positive 
relationship with ROE at 1% level. However, board independence, audit committee 
independence and audit committee expertise (Oroud, 2019) does not have a significant 
relationship with ROE. Besides, two control variables are used in both model, it shows that 
leverage has a significant positive relationship with both proxy (ROA and ROE) of profitability 
as in earlier studies (Alshetwi, 2017). However, firm size has a significant negative relationship 
with ROE only. 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis of this study shows that all corporate governance mechanism related to the board 
and audit committee does not have a significant influence on a firm's profitability in the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries of Bangladesh. Rather, there are few variables of board 
and audit committee characteristics which have direct influences on the firm’s profitability. The 
multiple regression analysis reveals that board size, board expertise, and audit committee size, 
have significant positive relationships with both the proxies of profitability i.e. ROA and ROE. 
However, audit committee expertise and ROA have a significant negative relationship where 
audit committee expertise and ROE have insignificant relation. Besides, board independence 
and audit committee independence do not have significant relationships with any of the proxy 
variables. This study may further be extended for all listed firms in DSE which will reveal the 
overall picture of corporate governance practices and its importance in an emerging economy, 
like Bangladesh.  
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